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Insufficient labor policies contribute to poverty, while those poverty 
conditions contribute to limited employment opportunities and labor 
rights abuses. Traditional multilateral lending institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, provide development 
aid but tend to treat labor policies as incompatible with efficient market 
functioning. The International Labor Organization (ILO), on the other 
hand, provides development assistance specifically targeting labor 
policies. Unlike traditional lending institutions, the ILO’s assistance 
imposes no conditions. Instead, the ILO’s mandate requires it to design 
its programs in consultation with the recipient country’s government and 
social partners.  
This article studies the ILO’s assistance under the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Closely examining two SADC 
Member States, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, it finds that the ILO’s 
assistance fails to strengthen labor rights in countries that do not already 
have strong social partners and social dialogue platforms. In those cases, 
the ILO cannot second-guess its requisite consultative structure; yet, it 
must still use the results of those consultations – however dominated by 
the stronger factions – to design its assistance programs.  
This article concludes by arguing that prior to designing its assistance 
programs, the ILO must invest its resources, when needed, to strengthen 
the social dialogue platform and social-partner capacity in the country.  
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Former legal officer at the International Labour Organization.  This article expresses only 
the personal views of the author and does not reflect the official views of any of the 
above institutions.  The author would like to thank Lance Compa, Jack Getman, Terri 
LeClercq, and Jeffrey Vogt for their views, as well as the staff of Michigan State 
International Law Review (and, in particular, Tia Rowe) for careful editing.  Any 
remaining errors are to be attributed to the stubborn author.  
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This task will be difficult, as it requires preconditions and potential 
delays. Nevertheless, by constructing its assistance to ensure full and 
effective consultations at the outset, the ILO’s assistance will have a 
greater impact on labor rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic development and labor rights are often seen as mutually 
exclusive.2  Countries that are trying to grow economically invest their 
limited resources in market-oriented policies, often at the expense of 
worker rights.3   
As countries strive to develop, they are increasingly turning to 
regional integration for their economic growth strategy.4  By forming  
  
 2. See Jack I. Garvey, AFTA after NAFTA: Regional Trade Blocs and the 
Propagation of Environmental and Labor Standards, 15 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 245, 245, 
249 (1997); see also Maria Lorena Cook, Regional Integration and Transnational Labor 
Strategies Under NAFTA, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
NORTH AMERICA 142, 142 (M.L. Cook & H.C. Katz, eds., 1994) (“the 
internationalization of the economy has tended to weaken labor movements . . .”).  
 3. Reed M. Wood, Funding Workers’ Rights: OECD Development Assistance 
and the Promotion of ILO Labor Standards in the Developing World 35 (Sept. 22, 2006) 
(prepared for U.N.C. Workshop on Labor Rights and Multinational Production, UNC–
Chapel Hill) (“as a country develops economically its level of respect for core labor 
standards declines.”); Ajit Singh & Ann Zammit, Labour Standards and the ‘Race to the 
Bottom’: Rethinking Globalization and Workers’ Rights from Developmental and 
Solidaristic Perspectives, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y. 85, 85, 87 (2004); Daniel 
Berliner, Anne Greenleaf, Milli Lake & Jennifer Noveck, Building Capacity, Building 
Rights? State Capacity and Labor Rights in Developing Countries, 72 WORLD DEV. 127, 
127 (2015) (discussing the literature attributing lack of capacity to low labor standards); 
see Tanja A. Börzel & Vera van Hüllen, Patching Together a Global Script: The Demand 
for and Supply of Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations, in GOVERNANCE 
TRANSFER BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PATCHING TOGETHER A GLOBAL SCRIPT 245, 
245–46 (Tanja A. Börzel & Vera van Hüllen, eds., 2015); MARK SHADUR, LABOUR 
RELATIONS IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 1 (1994).   
Nevertheless, countries that improve their labor standards are more likely to attract 
foreign direct investment and assistance due to the perception of better industrial 
relations. See Merran Hulse & Anna van der Vleuten, Agent Run Amuck: The SADC 
Tribunal and Governance Transfer Roll-back, in GOVERNANCE TRANSFER BY REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: PATCHING TOGETHER A GLOBAL SCRIPT 84, 87–88 (Tanja A. Börzel & 
Vera van Hüllen, eds., 2015).   “External funding consistently makes up half or more of 
SADC’s annual budget.” Id. at 87. 
 4. See Paul A. Smit, Transnational Labor Relations in SADC, 6 J. 
GLOBALIZATION STUD. 14, 14, 26 (2015) (“The proliferation of regional formations 
indicates a willingness on the part of governments to commit themselves to collaboration 
around trade issues . . .”); Marianne H. Marchand, Morten Boås & Timothy M. Shaw, 
The Political Economy of New Regionalisms, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 897, 897 (1999). 
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regional, economic blocs, countries are able to harmonize markets and 
weather economic fluctuations more efficiently than if they remained 
isolated.5  These harmonized economic policies are codified through 
regional integration agreements (RIAs).   
Regional integration efforts first concentrated solely on integrating 
economic policies within regions.6  Since the 1990s, however, RIA 
partners have begun to include socio-political elements into their efforts, 
including the objective of harmonizing labor rights.7   
The inclusion of labor rights in RIAs seeks to provide a common 
minimum floor of labor protections so that no regional member may 
claim a “comparative advantage[] by having less favourable labor 
legislation.”8  This common floor is also appealing because it allows 
countries to define and implement regional labor rights rather than 
having to satisfy the expectations of industrialized countries at an 
international level.9   
The objective to harmonize labor standards is deceptively simple.  
RIAs are often ratified by countries that are at very different levels of 
economic development.10  Those countries that are on the lower end of  
  
 5. See KOFI ADDO, CORE LABOUR STANDARDS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
LESSONS FROM THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 306 (2016). 
 6. See Pharis J. Harvey, Terry Collingsworth & Bama Athreya, Developing 
Effective Mechanisms for Implementing Labor Rights in the Global Economy, INT’L LAB. 
RTS. FUND 1, 16 (2000). 
 7. For an analysis of the evolution of these regional labor efforts, see id. at 16–
31. 
 8. See ARTURO BRONSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW: 
CURRENT CHALLENGES 93 (2009). 
 9. See id. at 93–94; Nicola Yeates & Bob Deacon, “Globalism, Regionalism and 
Social Policy: framing the debate,” UNU:CRIS Occasional Papers, U.N.U.: COMP. 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION STUD. 3 (0-2006/6) (“Since regional formations often 
entail groups of countries with similar (or at least less diverse) cultural, legal and political 
characteristics and legacies, agreement on the scope and nature of collaboration may be 
more feasible and progress can potentially be made more quickly compared with global 
multilateral negotiations involving a wide diversity of countries.”), available at 
http://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/O-2006-6.pdf; see generally Adelle 
Blackett, Beyond Standard Setting: A Study of ILO Technical Cooperation on Regional 
Law Reform in West and Central Africa, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 443, 450 (2011).  
 10. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 249. 
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the spectrum cannot always provide the resource mobilization and re-
distribution to accommodate for unequal resources.11   
Acknowledging these challenges, the multilateral community has 
called for labor-related assistance to enable developing countries to 
respect labor rights.12  The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the 
Poor, for example, acknowledges that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of 
the rights of individual workers and of their organisations is critical for 
breaking the cycle of poverty.”13  The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, 
which was adopted at the U.N. Third Conference on Financing for 
Development, calls for “advance[ing] fully towards an equitable global 
economic system in which no country or person is left behind, enabling 
decent work and productive livelihoods for all, while preserving the 
planet for our children and future generations.”14  
As part of their development efforts, governments often request 
assistance from traditional multilateral lending institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), multilateral banks, such as the 
World Bank, or bilateral donor agencies of Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.15  However, these 
traditional forms of development assistance do not effectively answer the 
multilateral call for labor-related assistance.16  
  
 11. Id.  
 12. See Anne Trebilock, Setting the Record Straight about International Labor 
Standard Setting, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 101, 106–07 (2010); David M. Trubek, 
Jim Mosher & Jeffrey S. Rothstein, Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor 
Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks, 25 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 1187, 1188 (2000) (“Either way, integration affects industrial relations by 
exposing national labor markets to global competition, making it harder for states to 
control labor conditions within their borders.”).   
 13. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE: REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR 37 (2008).   
 14. Third International Conference on Financing for Development, Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.227/L.1 (July 15, 2015), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.227/L.1.  
 15. See RUMU SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: RULE OF LAW, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL FINANCE 80, 87–89 (2009). 
 16. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 193 (2005); see 
also Peter Auer, Security in Labour Markets: Combining Flexibility with Security in 
Decent Work 1–2 (Econ. & Labour Mkt. Papers, ILO, Paper No. 2007/12, 2012); see also 
 
2018] Strengthening the Southern African Development Community 47 
 
Rather than answering that call, IMF and World Bank assistance often 
treats labor rights as incompatible with efficient market functioning.17  
These institutions instead presume that stronger labor rights stifle 
employment growth and economic markets.18  They provide loans and 
other forms of assistance to strengthen markets, but will in turn impose 
conditionality.19  Those conditions typically require strict regulatory and 
austerity measures.20  At best, this assistance fails to promote a conducive 
environment for labor standards.  At worst, it promotes dismantling 
worker rights by eliminating wage protection and by imposing excessive 
work hours and other exploitative labor conditions.21  
  
Janine Berg & David Kucera, Labour Institutions in the Developing World: Historical 
and Theoretical Perspectives, in IN DEFENCE OF LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS: 
CULTIVATING JUSTICE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 22–27 (Janine Berg & David Kucera, 
eds., 2008). 
 17. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 193 (2005); see 
also Peter Auer, Security in Labour Markets: Combining Flexibility with Security in 
Decent Work 1 (Econ. & Labour Mkt. Papers, ILO, Paper No. 2007/12, 2012); see also 
Janine Berg & David Kucera, Labour Institutions in the Developing World: Historical 
and Theoretical Perspectives, in IN DEFENCE OF LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS: 
CULTIVATING JUSTICE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 22–27 (Janine Berg & David Kucera, 
eds., 2008). 
 18. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019: THE CHANGING 
NATURE OF WORK, 63, para. 249, (June 1, 2018) (working draft), 
https://docslide.us/documents/wdr-2019-the-changing-nature-of-work-world-a-very-
positive-impact-a-fairly.html. Recently, the World Bank’s working draft of its World 
Development Report 2019 reaffirmed the economic theory that “[c]omplex and costly 
procedures to start a business discourage entrepreneurs . . . Reducing the regulatory 
burden may encourage formal firms to grow, thus creating steady jobs that could be 
accessed by certain segments of the poor.”  Id.  See also Adelle Blackett, Trade 
Liberalization, Labour Law, and Development: A Contextualization, at 9, (Int’l Inst. For 
Labour Studies, Discussion Paper Ser. No. 179, 2007) (citing to the 2005 World Bank 
report entitled Doing business in 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth), 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
inst/documents/publication/wcms_193514.pdf; see GERRY RODGERS, EDDY LEE, LEE 
SWEPSTON, & JASMIEN VAN DAELE, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND 
THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1919-2009, at 23 (2009).  
 19. See SARKAR, supra note 15, at 89. 
 20. Id. at 275. 
 21. See, e.g., HEPPLE, supra note 17, at 17–18; see also Yossi Dahan, Hanna 
Lerner & Faina Milman-Sivan, Shared Responsibility and the International Labour 
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The International Labor Organization (ILO), the U.N. specialized 
agency mandated to adopt and supervise international labor standards, 
fills this development void.22  As part of its mandate, the ILO provides 
labor-related technical assistance to its member States upon their 
request.23  Unlike traditional assistance, ILO assistance aims to stimulate 
economic development by strengthening labor and industrial relations 
policies.24  This assistance is provided unconditionally.25   
 
  
Organization, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 675, 683 (2012) (arguing that “exploitation of workers 
in the global labor market occurs on an institutional level, namely, in existing regulations 
of the global economy that have been determined by global institutions (for example, the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO)) or 
through intergovernmental agreements.”); ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING 
DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 39–40 (2d ed. 2012) 
(describing the discourse of development, whereby modernization took priority over 
social, cultural, and political elements); SARKAR, supra note 15, at 276 (“[t]he human 
cost of adjustment policies could be measured in terms of sharply increased 
unemployment levels, reductions in real wages, and drastically reduced social services to 
the most vulnerable segments of the population . . . ”); PIA RIGGIROZZI, ADVANCING 
GOVERNANCE IN THE SOUTH: WHAT ROLES FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
IN DEVELOPING STATES? 155 (Timothy Shaw ed., 2009) (“despite successfully tackling 
problems of hyperinflation and economic stabilization, externally led neoliberal reforms 
impacted negatively on state–society relations and . . . created vulnerabilities and 
insecurity particularly among low-income groups, which suffered the most from the costs 
of economic recession and high rates of unemployment.”).   
 22. See generally Int’l Labour Org. [ILO] Constitution, annex (May 10, 1944), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453
907:NO [hereinafter ILO Const.]. 
 23. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-up, ILO (June 18, 1998), 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm 
[hereinafter Declaration on Fundamental Principles] (“Recognizes the obligation on the 
Organization to assist its Members, in response to their established and expressed needs . 
. . by making full use of its constitutional, operational and budgetary resources, including, 
by the mobilization of external resources and support . . . “). 
 24. See, e.g., INT’L LABOUR ORG., ILO DECLARATION ON SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR A 
FAIR GLOBALIZATION 9–13 (2008) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE DECLARATION], 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
cabinet/documents/genericdocument/wcms_371208.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 12–13. 
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In addition to providing assistance to its individual Members, the ILO 
also provides assistance to regions that are in the process of integration.26  
In doing so, it must design its programs to harmonize labor and 
economic policies while taking into account uneven levels of 
development.27 
The ILO’s labor-related assistance stands apart from traditional 
assistance not only because of its labor aim, but also because of its 
approach.  While World Bank, IMF, and other traditional assistance 
institutions impose pre-defined objectives and conditionality, the ILO 
must design its assistance programs and define its goals in consultation 
with representatives of government, trade unions, and employers in the 
recipient country or region.28  This unique design is conducive where the 
recipient, at the time of consultation, is already capable of holding those 
consultations.29  Where it is not (in particular, when its trade unions are 
weak or there is no effective platform for social dialogue), the ILO’s 
assistance falls short.   
This challenge is clearly demonstrated in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).  SADC is comprised of sixteen 
countries30 that are all at very different stages of development.31  These  
  
 26. See, e.g., Challenges and Opportunities for Labour in the Caribbean 
Community, at 1, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-
lima/---sro-port_of_spain/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_306348.pdf (discussing 
the ILO’s efforts to assist “the Caribbean Community Secretariat in trying to establish 
and sustain a viable agenda for labour in the context of regional and international 
development”) (last visited Dec. 02, 2018). 
 27. See id. at 1–3. 
 28. See infra p. 13. 
 29. Indeed, as the ILO itself has acknowledged: “freedom of association is not 
just a desired outcome of development, but an integral part of the broader process of 
development and a critical component of all free and open societies. Without it, there can 
be no genuine or effective dialogue or cooperation between workers, employers and 
government on development and labour issues.”  Int’l Labour Org., Freedom of 
Association and Development, at 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_160208.pdf.   
 30. Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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different stages of development are coupled with varied approaches to 
labor rights.  Some SADC Members have strong social partners, 
including trade unions, and long histories of effective social dialogue.32  
Other Members have consistently ensured weak social-partner 
participation and social dialogue through years of State-led oppression 
and exploitative labor laws.33   
Despite their disparate economies and levels of social-partner 
participation, SADC Members have requested ILO assistance to 
harmonize national laws and practices at a regional level and to gain 
industrial stability at a national level.34 To help SADC Members realize 
their objectives, the ILO provides various forms of assistance at both 
levels.35  Over the past ten years, it has provided assistance in the forms 
of decent work programs, high-level advisory missions, and capacity-
building workshops.36  Some of the recipient countries have made 
notable improvements in their labor laws and practices.37  Others, 
however, have not.38   
This article examines the ILO’s development assistance to strengthen 
labor rights under SADC’s RIA initiatives, from the early 200839 through  
  
 31. Jan Bronauer & Ji Yoon, Regional Economic Development in SADC: Taking 
Stock and Looking Ahead, Rep. No. 25, at 11 (Aug. 2018), available at 
https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/saia_report-25_Bronnauer-
Yoon_20181102.pdf.  For example, while Angola enjoyed an 18 % GDP in 2017, 
Swaziland’s GDP was at 1 %.  Id. 
 32. See generally Colin Fenwick, Evance Kalula, & Ingrid Landau, Labour Law: 
A Southern African perspective, at 24–25 (Int’l Inst. For Labour Studies Geneva, 
Discussion Paper Ser. No. 180, 2007). 
 33. See id. 
 34. For a description of SADC instruments committing its Member States to 
harmonizing labor standards, see infra p. 6.   
See also Fenwick et al., supra note 32, at 7–8 (discussing SADC treaties and protocols 
that aim to harmonize national labor laws). 
 35. See infra pp. 17–18. 
 36. See infra pp. 17–19. 
 37. See, e.g., Fenwick et al., supra note 31, at 7–8. 
 38. See, e.g., Peter Nanyenya Takirambudde, Protection of Labour Rights in the 
Age of Democratization and Economic Restructuring in Southern Africa, 39 J. AFR. L. 
39, 48 (1995). 
 39. Following the implementation of the SADC-ILO Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on labor.  See Memorandum of Understanding between the 
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2015.40  Part I describes the role of labor rights in development, the 
ILO’s system of labor standards, and its assistance to Members to 
strengthen those standards.  Part I also outlines three key areas in which 
the ILO’s assistance is unique to traditional forms of multilateral 
development aid.  Part II examines the ILO’s assistance provided in two 
SADC Member States—Zimbabwe and Swaziland—to strengthen their 
capacities under SADC integration.  In examining the labor rights in 
those countries, this paper concentrates on freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, both of which are particularly critical for 
developing economies.  Part III concludes by drawing lessons from the 
varied impact of the ILO’s assistance in Zimbabwe and Swaziland.  It 
challenges the orthodox theory behind the ILO’s assistance, and offers an 
alternative approach that calls for the ILO to create a more effective 
design for each recipient country prior to carrying out its assistance 
programs.  
II. LABOR AND DEVELOPMENT 
Poverty and labor exploitation are twin problems.41 Insufficient labor 
policies contribute to poverty, while those poverty conditions, in turn,  
  
Southern African Development Community and the International Labour Organization, at 
23-25, Official Bulletin, vol. 90, no. 1 (Apr. 19, 2007), 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_440105.pdf 
 40. In 2015, the United States withdrew trade benefits to Swaziland under its 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) owing to labor rights concerns.  See 
President Obama removes Swaziland, reinstates Madagascar for AGOA Benefits, OFF. OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (June 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/June/President-Obama-removes-Swaziland-
reinstates-Madagascar-for-AGOA-Benefits. It is not possible to distinguish whether 
positive labor measures undertaken in the country (or even the region, by additional 
AGOA beneficiaries) were motivated by ILO development assistance, the desire to 
assuage U.S. concerns over labor rights, or both.  This paper therefore assesses the impact 
of the ILO’s assistance prior to that withdrawal. 
 41. Valentine K. Ntandayarwo, The Role of Trade Unions in Poverty Alleviation: 
Priority Agenda for the 21st Century, in TRADE UNIONS AND POVERTY: ALLEVIATION IN 
AFRICA 27, 33 (Mohammed Mwamadzingo & Ditiro Saleshando, eds. 2003); see also 
Fumane ‘Malebona Khabo, Collective Bargaining and Labour Disputes Resolution – Is 
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contribute to limited employment opportunities and labor rights abuses.42 
Multilateral organizations acknowledge this intrinsic link.43  The United 
Nations has included human rights among its poverty indicators, 
concluding that human development critically turns on achieving decent 
employment opportunities for men and women.44  The U.N. 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development similarly includes among its goals 
the need to ensure decent work, such as by promoting labor rights.45   
In addition to global measures, the U.N. system has embraced the 
concept of regional integration as a way to “tame” the negative 
consequences of globalization.46  In 2006, for example, UNESCO held a 
High-Level Symposium on the Social Policy Dimension of 
Regionalism.47  This Symposium produced the Buenos Aires 
Declaration, calling on “regional organisations such as MERCOSUR and 





SADC Meeting the Challenge?, at 1 (ILO Sub-Reg’l Office for S. Afr., Issues Paper No. 
30, 2008) (“Promoting employment and fighting poverty is a major challenge facing the 
world today . . . ”); Trebilock, supra note 12, at 559 (noting the “relevance of 
international labour standards to [economic] development.”). 
 42. See RODGERS, et al., supra note 18, at 23–24; Christian Barry & Sanjay G. 
Reddy, International Trade and Labor Standards: A Proposal for Linkage, 39 CORNELL 
INT’L L. J. 545, 607–08 (2006) (“The attainment of at least some basic labor standards 
must be understood as constitutive of development; promoting these standards is a form 
of promoting development itself.”).  
 43. See OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF 
CORE WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 16 (1996). Indeed, the OECD has 
debunked fears that compliance with labor standards will harm developing countries. Id. 
at 105. 
 44. See generally U.N. Dev. Program, Human Development Report 2000, at 91 
(2000), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/261/hdr_2000_en.pdf. 
 45. See G.A. Res. 70/1, at Goal 8 (Sep. 25, 2015). 
 46. See Deacon et al., Globalisation and the Emerging Regional Governance of 
Labour Rights, 32 INT’L J. OF MANPOWER, 334, 335 (2011); see also Int’l Inst. For 
Labour Studies, Deepening the Social Dimensions of Regional Integration at 1 (2008), 
available at https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/938779/file/938785.   
 47. See Deacon et al., supra note 46, at 335. 
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regional integration and [called] on the UN to facilitate inter-regional 
dialogues.”48   
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) 
The onus of providing development assistance to strengthen decent 
work and labor standards falls squarely on the ILO’s shoulders.  It was 
established in 1919 under the premise that poverty and labor rights are 
intrinsically linked.49  As stated in its Constitution, “poverty anywhere 
constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere.”50  Its constitutional 
tripartite structure – representatives of governments, employers, and 
workers – enables the Organization to approach development policies 
and programs from a holistic, industrial approach.51  As discussed below, 
its system of labor standards (including in particular freedom of 
association and collective bargaining), coupled with its unique design of 
assistance, helps the Organization to carry out its objective.  
A. The ILO’s System of Labor Standards 
In its 1998 Declaration, the ILO confirmed: 
Whereas, in seeking to maintain the link between social progress and 
economic growth, the guarantee of fundamental . . . [labor rights] is of  
  
 48. Id. (quoting the Buenos Aires Declaration). See also the ECOSOC Ministerial 
Declaration, at para 33 (2006) (calling for “cooperation and coordination, in the pursuit 
of the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all.”); World 
Comm’n on the Soc. Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating 
Opportunities for All, at 94 (ILO 2004), available at 
https://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf; Franz Christian Ebert & Anne 
Posthuma, Labour Standards and Development Finance Institutions: A Review of 
Current Policies and Activities, at 1 (Int’l Inst. For Labour Studies, Discussion Paper Ser. 
No. 204, 2010) (“Increasingly, international bodies have called for DFIs to take into 
account the promotion of decent working conditions when carrying out their investment 
operations.”). 
 49. See id.  
 50. See ILO Const., supra note 22.  
 51. See generally How the ILO works, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
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particular significance in that it enables the persons concerned, to claim 
freely and on the basis of equality of opportunity, their fair share of the 




The ILO accordingly treats economic and social policies as mutually 
reinforcing, and aims to ensure a “level playing field” by promoting the 
ratification and implementation of its labor standards.53  To supervise the 
implementation of those standards, the ILO maintains an intricate 
supervisory machinery.54  First, its Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) meets 
once a year to discuss the implementation of all ILO member States 
concerning the conventions they have ratified.55  Second, cases of 
particular importance or significant violations are then taken up by the 
Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS), which meets during 
the annual International Labor Conference (ILC).56 Exceptionally, the 
ILO’s highest-level supervisory body, the Commission of Inquiry, takes 
up cases of significant failure and conducts in-country fact-finding 
missions.57 
B. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining rights are critical for 
ensuring that economic development does not undermine worker rights.  
This importance has been affirmed by the multilateral community,  
 
  
 52. See Declaration on Fundamental Principles, supra note 23, at preamble. 
 53. See INT’L LABOUR ORG., RULES OF THE GAME: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, 11 (ILO 3rd rev. ed. 2014), 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-
publications/publications/WCMS_318141/lang--en/index.htm. 
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. Id. at 102–03. 
 56. Id.  
 57. For a holistic explanation of the ILO’s system of supervision, see id. at 102–
09.  
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including in ILO, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization 
reports,58 as well by development experts. 59    
Dialogue between employers and workers redresses “confrontational 
attitudes and acrimony . . . [that is typically] associated with the 
employment relationship.”60  Consequently, it “promot[es] industrial 
peace and ultimately, economic growth.”61  It also contributes to poverty 
reduction strategies by, for example, determining minimum wages, 
housing, “health and safety, education for children, and income 
distribution.”62   
In an RIA, social dialogue among national trade unions and 
employers enables policy makers to overcome integration challenges.63  
Efforts to reduce poverty through integration have, in turn, also created 
the opportunity for strengthened participation of, and dialogue among, 
social partners.64   
While critical, these standards are “achievable [only] when there are 
strong and independent trade unions and employer[s’] organisations” 
sufficiently positioned to engage in social dialogue.65  This dialogue is 
essential to represent the views of their members on economic and social  
 
  
 58. See, e.g., Freedom of Association and Development, supra note 29, at 1, 2–3, 
26, 59–60.  
 59. See, e.g., Khabo, supra note 41, at 1. 
 60. Id.   
 61. Id.  See also Tzannatos, supra note 58, at 175 (“bargaining coordination 
reduces strike activity; in turn, a high level of strikes impacts negatively on economic 
outcomes.”).   
 62. See, e.g., Mohammed Mwamadzingo, Poverty Alleviation and the Role of 
Workers’ Organizations in Africa, in TRADE UNIONS AND POVERTY: ALLEVIATION IN 
AFRICA 17, 23 (Mohammed Mwamadzingo & Ditiro Saleshando eds., 2003). 
 63. See Paul Smit, Regional Labour Standards in the SADC: Is it Possible, Given 
the EU Experience?, 2 J.L., SOC., & DEV. 165, 172 (2015).  
 64. See, generally Mwamadzingo, supra note 62, at 23. 
 65. See ADDO, supra note 5, at 103–04.  The term “social dialogue” is defined by 
the ILO “to include all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of 
information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, 
on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy.”  See Int’l Labour 
Office, Social Dialogue: Finding a Common Voice, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/download/brochure.pdf.  
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policy issues. 66  However, these social partners must be able to carry out 
that dialogue; they cannot meaningfully contribute to poverty alleviation 
in a prohibitive atmosphere.67 
C. The ILO’s Unique Assistance: The Decent Work Agenda  
The multilateral community acknowledges that labor rights such as 
freedom of association and collective bargaining are a “cornerstone” to 
development.68  Nevertheless, the results-based framework for traditional 
development programs treats the standards as a subsidiary social good.69  
The ILO thus stands alone in providing assistance to countries with a 




 66. See Int’l Labour Office, Social Dialogue: Finding a Common Voice, supra 
note 65. Generally, international law acknowledges the crucial role played by various 
non-State, or social partner, actors in the development and decision-making process.  See 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, A ‘Dialogic’ Approach in Perspective, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK IN TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 65, 65 (Adelle Blackett & Anne Trebilcock 
eds., 2015).   
 67. See Mwamadzingo, supra note 62, at 22–23.  
 68. See Int’l Labour Org., Freedom of Association and Development, supra note 
29, at 1. 
 69. See Deacon et al., supra note 46, at 335.  See generally Robert Dañino, The 
Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Work on Human Rights, 41 INT’L LAW 21, 22–23 
(2007) (discussing the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement, which “provide that only the 
economic considerations . . . shall be relevant to the decisions of the Bank and its 
officers.”).  
For example, in 2013, the World Bank’s World Development Report found that labor 
regulations and standards had little to no impact on employment.  See WORLD BANK, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: JOBS 258, 261–62 (2013).  And most recently, in its 2019 
report, the World Bank reiterated its position that that such labor regulations could stifle 
employment and firm growth.  See WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2019: The Changing Nature of Work 114–17 (2019), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/816281518818814423/pdf/2019-WDR-
Report.pdf (“while regulations address labor market imperfections, they often reduce 
dynamism in the economy by affecting labor market flows and increasing the length of 
time spent in both employment and unemployment”).     
 70. For an in-depth discussion of the background and impetus for the ILO’s 
assistance programs, see generally RODGERS ET AL., supra note 18, at ch. 6.  
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created a Decent Work Agenda, which makes clear that ILO assistance 
for economic growth must entail decent working conditions.71   
The ILO’s Decent Work Agenda is translated into national or region-
specific programs through Decent Work Country Programs (DWCPs).72 
The ILO designs each DWCP individually to address the specific needs 
and priorities that are identified through consultations with recipient 
governments and representatives of workers’ and employers’ 
associations.73  This process is set out in Table 1, below. 
  
 71. The ILO Director-General affirmed at this time that “[t]he primary goal of the 
ILO today is to promote opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and 
productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity.”  Int’l 
Labour Conference, Report of the Director-General: Decent Work, 87th session (June 
1999).  
 72. For a detailed description of the ILO’s DWCPs see INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, 
ILO DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME: A PRACTICAL GUIDEBOOK 1 (Ver. 4, 2016), 
available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---
program/documents/genericdocument/wcms_561025.pdf. 
 73. ILO, PROGRAMME AND BUDGET FOR THE BIENNIUM 2016-17 at 14 (2015), 
available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---
program/documents/genericdocument/wcms_565220.pdf (“Based on national needs 
assessments, legal gap analyses and the comments of the supervisory bodies, the ILO will 
provide expert advice and technical assistance to member States that request it to 
overcome gaps in the application of ratified Conventions and promote further 
ratifications.”); see also Michael Sebastian, Poverty Reduction and Decent Work: The 
Role of the ILO, in TRADE UNIONS AND POVERTY: ALLEVIATION IN AFRICA 9, 13 
(Mohammed Mwamadzingo & Ditiro Saleshando eds., 2003). 
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By virtue of its DWCPs, the ILO’s assistance differs from traditional 
assistance programs in three ways: (i) its objective expressly includes 
labor standards, (ii) its design is based on the input of national 
stakeholders, and (iii) it provides advisory support. 
1. Objective  
The ILO’s Social Justice Declaration forms the basis for its assistance 
programs.74  It states:  
[T]he Organization should review and adapt its institutional practices to 
enhance governance and capacity building in order to make the best use 
of its human and financial resources and of the unique advantage of its  
  
 74. See SOCIAL JUSTICE DECLARATION, supra note 24, at 12–13. 




Source: INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, ILO DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDEBOOK (Ver. 4, 2016), 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/--    
program/documents/genericdocument/wcms_561025.pdf  
Step 1: consult with constituency and other 
stakeholders;  
Step 2: country diagnostic; 
Step 3: prepare main country program document;  
Step 4: clear outputs and monitoring, and 
evaluation strategies. 
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tripartite structure and standards system, with a view to . . . help, 
wherever necessary, the institutional capacity of member States, as well 
as representative organizations of employers and workers, to facilitate 




Traditional multilateral actors, such as lending institutions and 
development agencies, also provide assistance based on their individual 
mandates.  However, as opposed to the ILO’s Social Justice Declaration, 
these traditional actors have mandates that concentrate on economic 
reconstruction (e.g., the World Bank76) or the promotion of monetary 
cooperation and stability (e.g., the IMF77).  In other words, the assistance 
stemming from those mandates prioritizes measured approaches to 
economic growth over normative standards such as labor.  
While noting this distinction, certain exceptions bear mentioning.  
Development assistance that aims specifically to strengthen labor rights, 
including by strengthening the roles of labor unions and other important 
civil society actors, has been a critical priority in many bilateral and 
multilateral assistance programs in the United States, the European 





 75. See id. 
 76. See KATHERINE MARSHALL, THE WORLD BANK: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO 
DEVELOPMENT TO EQUITY 2–4 (Rutledge ed., 2008). 
 77. See Devesh Kapur, The IMF: A Cure or a Curse?, 111 FOREIGN POL’Y 114, 
116 (1998). 
 78. As bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have increasingly begun to 
include labor standards commitments, developed trade partners have begun to invest a 
heavy amount of foreign assistance into their trade-partner countries.  This assistance has 
its own complicated implications, worthy of close examination, but which is 
distinguishable from traditional multilateral assistance and hence goes beyond the scope 
of this paper.  For an interesting examination of the various types of such trade partner 
development assistance, see Kevin Banks, Trade, Labor and International Governance: 
An Inquiry into the Potential Effectiveness of the New International Labor Law, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L 45, 4546, 48 (2011).   
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include labor rights in its programs.79 These alternative programs 
certainly contribute to strengthening labor rights during economic 
development.  However, in isolation, they do not go far enough.  
Multilateral initiatives tend to be ad hoc, reflecting the priorities of the 
giving countries.80  In other respects, some multilateral assistance 
programs focus on broader human rights.81  Maintaining labor rights as a 
secondary or tertiary objective may minimize the impact of economic 
development on labor rights, but it will not be sufficient to significantly 
impact the rights of workers.82  
2. Design 
The ILO’s DWCPs are designed in consultation with the national 
representatives of government, workers, and employers.83  As illustrated 
in Table 1, above, the ILO’s DWCP process begins with consulting the 
national tripartite constituents in the country before designing its 
objectives and plans.  As opposed to the ILO’s DWCPs, traditional 
development programs are designed based on predefined objectives and  
  
 79. For a description of bilateral and multilateral developments in labor 
development assistance, including a description of the OECD programs, see Wood, supra 
note 3, at 9–15.   
The World Bank has acknowledged the importance of a bottom-up approach, such as in 
its Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs, which sought local ownership informed by 
local needs and conditions; in other words, it was not merely “a generic package of 
reforms.”  See, e.g., Brian Langille, Imagining Post “Geneva Consensus” Labor Law for 
Post “Washington Consensus” Development, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 523, 529 
(2010).  For a discussion of the potential for Poverty Reduction Programs to address 
human rights, see Gobind Nankani, John Page & Lindsay Judge, Human Rights and 
Poverty Reduction Strategies: Moving Towards Convergence?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT ch. 18 (Philip Alston & Mary 
Robinson eds., 2005). 
 80. See generally Wood, supra note 3, at 9–15.   
 81. See id. at 13–15.  
 82. See id. at 34 (“only large increases in aid flows are likely to result in 
significant increases in the rights of workers.”). 
 83. See ILO DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME: A PRACTICAL GUIDEBOOK 
supra note 72, at 1 (noting that ILO DWCP are “based on ILO principles and standards, 
the priorities of the ILO’s constituents – governments, employers’ and workers’ 
organizations – and national development objectives.”).  
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policy goals that are crafted mainly by the donors.84  Their goals are 
typically quantitative and hence measurable; increases in exports or 
GDP, for example, may be identified, tracked, and reported.85 
3. Advisory Support 
The ILO’s assistance includes not only programmatic measures, such 
as the DWCPs, but also advisory support.86  For instance, the ILO holds 
in-country, high-level meetings and consultations with governments and 
representatives of workers and employers.87  It also advises governments 
and legislative bodies on drafting legislation and model laws.88 
The ILO’s supervisory bodies, including the CEACR and the CAS, 
provide guidance to governments through formal written comments 
concerning national implementation of labor standards.89  This guidance 
identifies laws and practices that need to be revised.90  As follow-up, the 
ILO may offer to hold high-level or technical meetings in country to 
provide additional assistance to governments.91  In this respect, the ILO’s  
  
 84. See Wood, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
 85. See, e.g., Factsheet: IMF Conditionality, IMF, 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/21/28/IMF-Conditionality 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“Most IMF financing is disbursed in installments and linked 
to demonstrable policy actions. This aims to ensure progress in program implementation 
and to reduce risks to the IMF’s resources.”).  
 86. See INT’L LABOUR ORG., RULES OF THE GAME: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 53, at 114–15; see also Sebastian, supra 
note 73, at 13. 
 87. See generally INT’L LABOUR ORG., RULES OF THE GAME: A BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 53, at 44–45. 
 88. One notable example of the ILO’s regional assistance in advising legislative 
reforms and model laws took place in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).  
CARICOM members requested ILO assistance to audit and assess the extent to which 
their existing national legislation complied with CARICOM Model Labour 
Harmonization Legislation.  For the results of those assessments, see Legislative Review 
for the 13 Caribbean Member States of the ILO, ILO (Sept. 09, 2014), 
http://www.ilo.org/caribbean/projects/WCMS_305932/lang--en/index.htm. 
 89. See INT’L LABOUR ORG., RULES OF THE GAME: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 53, at ch. 3.  
 90. See id. at 17.  
 91. See id. at 114.  
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advice and supervisory mechanisms operate synergistically to provide 
resources to developing countries to assist in their efforts, along with 
guidance and information concerning measures that should be taken.92   
The ILO’s assistance is illustrated in its extensive history with SADC.  
In SADC, the ILO has provided assistance to countries to strengthen 
their regional integration efforts, as well as their efforts to implement the 
ILO’s labor standards.93 
IV. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) 
SADC was established in 199294 under the Windhoek Declaration and 
Treaty to build a highly harmonized region.95  It aimed to “pool[] 
[regional] resources to achieve collective self-reliance” and improve the 
living standards of the people of the region.96  Currently, SADC 
Members have a total population of over 300 million people,97 a 
“combined GDP of about US $190 billion,98 and an estimated growth 
rate of around 6% per annum.”99  Its enormous regional economic  
  
 92. See id. 
 93. See infra at pp. 17–18. 
 94. See Ashimizo Afadameh-Adeyemi & Evance Kalula, SADC at 30: Re-
examining the Legal and Institutional Anatomy of the Southern African Development 
Community, MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN S. AFR. Y.B. 2010 at 5, 5.  SADC 
traces its institutional origin to the Frontline States (FLS), which had been set up by the 
region’s independent states in 1970.  Id. at 6 n.1. For an in-depth account of the historical 
background and developments of SADC, see generally id.   
 95. See Paul Smit, Transnational Labour Relations: A Dream or Possibility in 
SADC?, 22 AFR.  J. INT’L & COMP. L. 448, 454 (2014). 
 96. See SADC Vision, SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY [SADC], 
http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-vision/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
 97. See South African Development Community: Towards a Common Future, 
SADC Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2016, at 2 (2016), available at 
https://www.sadc.int/files/7315/0996/2411/SADC_-
__Selected_Indicators_2016.pdf.   
 98. See SADC, Southern African Development Community Decent Work 
Program 2013-2019, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
migrant/documents/genericdocument/wcms_379400.pdf.  
 99. See id. 
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potential contrasts sharply, however, with the sharp disparities in wealth 
among its Members.100 These disparities have raised critical challenges to 
its integration and harmonization objectives.  
A. Varied Labor Background 
Some SADC Members, such as South Africa, emerged from 
colonialism with a labor system that already respected social dialogue 
and civil-society participation.101 Others, notably Swaziland, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, and Angola, responded to independence by strengthening the 
role of the State at the expense of a greater civic participation.102 
Over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s,103 the majority of 
SADC Members adopted World Bank/IMF structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs), which called for economic liberalization, “micro-
economic policies (such as taxes and tariffs), macro-economic [policies] 
(fiscal policy) and institutional interventions.”104  Many of these 
programs were conditioned upon market-oriented policies, much to the 
detriment of labor rights.105  Those policies included, for example: 
reduced public-sector employment, decentralized wage systems, and 
increased labor flexibility, essentially permitting employers to easily 
terminate their employees.106  
B. SADC Labor Governance 
Despite some of the national policies of its Members, as a regional 




 100. See Bronauer et al., supra note 30, at 11.     
 101. See Takirambudde, supra note 38, at 39.  
 102. See, e.g., id. (discussing legislation and labor practices in those countries 
whereby the government suppressed trade unions and other social partners).   
 103. Id. at 40. 
 104. See World Bank, Structural Adjustment and Poverty: A Conceptual, 
Empirical and Policy Framework, Rep. No. 8393-AFR, at 22 (Feb. 9, 1990).  
 105. See id.; see also Takirambudde, supra note 38, at 40–41.  
 106. Fenwick et al., supra note 32, at 5. 
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rights.107  This aim is reflected both in the Consolidated Text of the 
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC Treaty) 
and the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC (the Social 
Charter) of 2003.  
1. SADC Treaty 
Article 5 of the SADC Treaty sets out the regional economic and 
political objectives.108  Economically, SADC aims to alleviate poverty 
and enhance the quality of life through regional integration.109  
Politically, it aims to “promote common political values, systems and . . .  
institutions.”110  To achieve these objectives, the Treaty’s provisions call 
on Members to harmonize their political and socio-economic policies 
and to promote “the free movement of capital and labour.”111    
2. The Social Charter 
The Social Charter clearly states that its objectives are to be read 
against the backdrop of “close and active consultations among social 
partners and in a spirit conducive to harmonious labor relations . . . .”112  
Its objectives pay special attention to “the retention of the tripartite 
structure”113 and the “formulation and harmonisation of legal, economic 
and social policies and programmes . . . .”114   
  
 107. See Pamhidzai H Bamu & Rutendo Mudarikwa, Social Regionalism in the 
Southern Africa Development Community: The International, Regional and National 
Interplay of Labour Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 455, 458–60 (Adelle Blackett & Anne 
Trebilcock eds., 2015). 
 108. See Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community, art. 5, (Oct. 21, 2015), available at https://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/4171.  
 109. See id. at art. 5(1)(a). 
 110. See id. at art. 5(1)(b). 
 111. See id. at art. 5(2)(a) – (d).  
 112. See Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC, art. 2(1), (Aug. 01, 
2003), available at https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/837.  
 113. See id. at art. 2(1)(a). 
 114. See id. at art. 2(1)(b). 
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The Charter places specific emphasis on the responsibility of its 
Members to “create an enabling environment consistent with ILO 
Conventions on freedom of association, the right to organise and 
collective bargaining . . . .”115  As follow-up, it requires States to submit 
regular reports to the SADC Secretariat, in consultation with the most 
representative organizations of employers and workers.116   
C. ILO Assistance in SADC 
In view of SADC’s commitment to “create an enabling environment” 
and to harmonize labor policies, the region was fertile ground for 
strengthening labor standards.  By the early 1990s, SADC Members had 
widely ratified the ILO’s conventions, including on freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.117  Despite their ratifications, 
countries did not necessarily transpose those labor standards into national 
laws or practices.118  While countries like Angola, Malawi, and South 
Africa ensured that their labor-standards commitments were reflected in 
their constitutions, countries like Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe took 
no legislative action to secure individual rights to freedom of 
association.119   
Many of the SADC Members that refused to secure labor rights 
witnessed years of industrial instability, whereby discontent workers 
would disrupt business operations through widescale strikes, and trade 
unions would gain political favor and eventually challenge national 
political landscapes.120  Faced with disparate treatment of labor rights and 
relative levels of industrial stability, the ILO’s assistance to SADC 
Members has faced challenges.  Nevertheless, the ILO has attempted to  
 
  
 115. See id. at art. 4. 
 116. See id. at art. 16(1)–(4).  Notably, however, the Charter does not define the 
period for such “regular” reporting and is silent concerning repercussions of non-
compliance. 
 117. See Paul A. Smit, Transnational Labor Relations in SADC: Regional 
Integration or Regional Globalization?, 6 J. GLOBALIZATION STUD. 14, 24 (2015). 
 118. See Takirambudde, supra note 38, at 46. 
 119. Id.  
 120. See infra pp. 25–27. 
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meet this challenge by providing consistent legal and technical assistance 
in SADC States at both regional and national levels.121  
1. ILO-SADC Memorandum of Understanding 
Albeit not a legally-binding instrument, SADC entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the ILO in 1998,122 and 
again in 2007.123  Under Article 1 of the 2007 MoU, the ILO and SADC 
committed to consult each other on the planning and execution of 
programs for promoting decent work “as a tool for socio-economic 
development.”124  This commitment extends to matters concerning 
“tripartite consultation at regional and national levels” and harmonization 
of labor legislation.125 
2. ILO-SADC Decent Work Program 
The ILO and SADC adopted a Decent Work Program to achieve 
effective social dialogue.126  This program acknowledged that capacity 
constraints may prevent certain SADC Members from effectively 
coordinating and monitoring the implementation of regional labor 
programs.127  Consequently, the program includes capacity-building  
 
  
 121. See Bamu et al., supra note 107, at 461–62. 
 122. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Southern African 
Development Community and the International Labour Organisation (1998), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_440104.pdf.  
 123. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Southern African 
Development Community and the International Labour Organization, at 23-25, ILO Off. 
Bull. Vol. XC, 2007, Ser. A, No. 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_440105.pdf.  
 124. Id. at art. 1. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Southern African Development Community Decent Work Program (2013-
2019), supra note 98, at 29.   
 127. Id.  
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assistance at the national level.128  The ILO has assisted Members within 
this framework to such an extent that its pervasive presence has been 
identified as a “key driver of labour law reform” in the region.129 
V. CASE STUDIES: ZIMBABWE AND SWAZILAND 
The SADC Decent Work Program and ILO-SADC MoU provide for 
ILO assistance to specific Members experiencing resource capacity 
constraints.  Zimbabwe and Swaziland have both benefitted from this 
assistance, particularly in terms of their freedom of association and 
collective bargaining laws and practices.   
A. Historical Background and Labor Developments 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe have similar political and labor histories.  
Following independence from colonial rule, both countries transitioned 
into authoritarian regimes, leaving civil society and trade union 
organizations weak and fractioned.130  The countries received IMF and 
World Bank development assistance,131 but nevertheless remained 
classified as authoritarian,132 and were accused of lacking the political 
will necessary to adhere to SADC’s labor commitments.133   
  
 128. Id. at 30–31. 
 129. See Bamu et al., supra note 107, at 455.  “Most of the labour legislation in the 
sub-region has been drafted through [] technical support . . . .”  See Khabo, supra note 41, 
at 3; Fenwick et al., supra note 34, at 7. 
 130. See PETER DWYER & LEO ZEILIG, AFRICAN STRUGGLES TODAY: SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 166 (2012).  
 131. For a listing of all World Bank projects by country, see Where We Work, 
WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/where-we-work (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018). For a listing of all IMF projects and reports by country, see IMF Country 
Information, IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).   
 132. See Johann Maree, The Role of Trade Unions in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
Defending and Promoting Democracy, at 7, Paper presented at the 16th International 
Labor and Employment Relations Association World Congress, Philadelphia, PA, July 2–
5, 2012,  
http://ilera2012.wharton.upenn.edu/RefereedPapers/MareeJohann%20ILERA.pd
f. 
 133. See Smit, supra note 63, at 184. 
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1. Zimbabwe: Historical Background 
Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, concluding a two-decade 
civil war between the white colonialist settlers and the Zimbabwe 
African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF).134  Zimbabwe’s 
new constitution, signed between the parties in December 1979, brought 
independence to the country, but did not effectively provide for the right 
to freedom of association.135  
The 1980s were characterized by a State autonomy, where the 
government intensified economic controls and increased social 
expenditures.136  The resulting hegemonic structure left no room for the 
struggling labor movement that, at that time, suffered from 
organizational and financial constraints, as well as internal 





 134. See Geoffrey Wood, Pauline Dibben & Gilton Klerck, The Limits of 
Transnational Solidarity: The Congress of South African Trade Unions and the 
Swaziland and Zimbabwean Crises, 54 LAB. HIST., 1, 5 (2013); see also Tawana H. 
Nyabeze, Progressive Reform in the New Constitution of Zimbabwe: A Balance Between 
the Preservative and Transformative Constitution Making Process, at 1 (Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, Feb. 2015), available at 
https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=fdcb52c2-ec77-2e9b-044d-
3347ea28156c&groupId=252038.  
 135. See generally Lancaster House Agreement, §§ X(1)–(2), Dec. 21, 1979 
(providing generally for the right of freedom of association while granting broad 
exceptions) with Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2001, published 90th ILC session, ILO, 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT
_ID:2207564 (noting overly broad powers of the labor authorities to interfere with 
freedom of association) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018). 
 136. See Brian Raftopoulos, The Labour Movement and the Emergence of 
Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe, in STRIKING BACK: THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE 
POST-COLONIAL STATE IN ZIMBABWE 1980-2000, 1, 3 (Brian Raftopoulos & Llyod 
Sachikonye eds., 2001). 
 137. Id. at 4. See also L. M. Sachikonye, The Institutional Development of Unions 
in Zimbabwe, in STRIKING BACK: THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE POST-COLONIAL 
STATE IN ZIMBABWE 1980-2000, 89, 92 (Brian Raftopoulos & Llyod Sachikonye eds., 
2001). 
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interventions entailed raising minimum wages in low-skilled sectors, the 
State placed severe restrictions on collective labor action.138 
The State established the country’s one national trade union, the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU), in 1981.139  At that time, 
its role supported the government “by refraining from recommending 
strike action and by urging workers to support [State] labor policies.”140  
The 1985 Labor Relations Act, promulgated by the government, 
addressed collective bargaining and industrial relations.141  It was, 
however, heavily criticized by employers’ and workers’ organizations for 
being State-dominated.142  The Act extensively regulated working 
conditions, such as minimum wages, and “imposed an unwieldy structure 
of industrial conciliation procedures”143 that effectively banned industrial 
action such as strikes.144  
By the end of the 1980s, the ZCTU had attracted a growing number of 
supporters.145  As protests and strikes drew tens of thousands into 




 138. See Guy C.Z. Mhone, The Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Urban 
Informal Sector in Zimbabwe, at 11, 13 (Int’l Inst. For Labour Studies, Discussion Paper 
Ser. 2, 1995). 
 139. See Qinisani Bhebe & Mildred Mahapa, The Decline in Trade Union Density 
in the 21st Century in Zimbabwe. A Case of Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union 
(ZCTU), 2 J. HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. & LAB. STUD., 67, 69 (2014); Wood et al., supra 
note 134, at 5–6. 
 140. See SHADUR, supra note 3, at 5; See Bhebe, et al., supra note 139, at 69; 
Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 5.  
 141. Tayo Fashoyin, Designed to Fail: The Social Partnership Experiment in 
Zimbabwe, 34 S. AFR. J. OF LAB. REL. 110, 113 (2010). 
 142. See Paris Yeros, The Rise and Fall of Trade Unionism in Zimbabwe, Part 1: 
1990-1995, 40 REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 219, 221 (2013); Mhone, supra note 138, at 11; 
see generally Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 5. 
 143. See Takirambudde, supra note 38, at 50. 
 144. See Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 5.  
 145. See Fashoyin, supra note 141, at 113.  
 146. See DWYER et al., supra note 130, at 167, 182–85.  
 147. See Richard Saunders, Trade Union Struggles for Autonomy and Democracy 
in Zimbabwe, in TRADE UNIONS AND THE COMING OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 157, 158 
(Jon Kraus ed., 2007). 
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asserted its independence.148 It quickly developed a mass power base 
among the urban working class and, by 1989, began openly challenging 
the government’s policies.149 
In 1990, the government adopted World Bank/IMF reforms and 
implemented the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP).150  
Under ESAP, the government committed to a number of economic 
policies, including trade liberalization, fiscal and monetary reforms, 
labor and price controls, and ending subsidies in several public and 
private sectors.151  ESAP, as well as two World Bank SAPs, precipitated 
high human development costs at the expense of employment 
protections.152   
The government unilaterally adopted a new Labor Relations Act in 
1992, despite ZCTU allegations that labor had been left without a voice 
in policy-making.153  The new Act contained some positive measures, 





 148. See Bhebe, et al., supra note 139,  at 70; see also Peter Makaye & 
Constantine Munhande, Zimbabwe’s Socialist Development Experiment 1980-1989, 18 
IOSR J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 63, 66 (2013). 
 149. See Bhebe, et al., supra note 139, at 69; Maree, supra note 132, at 15; see 
also Wood et al., supra note 134, at 1, 6.  
 150. See Mhone, supra note 138, at 16.  
 151. See Bhebe, et al., supra note 139, at 70; see also Mhone, supra note 138, at 
16–17, 19. 
 152. See Bhebe, et al., supra note 139, at 70;  see generally Walter Chambati, 
Changing Agrarian Labour Relations after Land Reform in Zimbabwe, in LAND AND 
AGRARIAN REFORM IN ZIMBABWE: BEYOND WHITE-SETTLER CAPITALISM 157, 161 (Sam 
Moyo & Walter Chambati, eds., 2013); see also World Bank Operations Evaluation 
Department, Zimbabwe Country Assistance Evaluation, Report No. 29058, (May 21, 
2004), available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/623251468781144014/pdf/290580Zim.pdf 
(finding that “[s]ocial progress slowed, per capita incomes declined, and the number of 
people living in extreme poverty increased.”); UN Development Programme, Human 
Development Report – Zimbabwe (1999), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/zhdr1999-globalisation.pdf.   
 153. See Yeros, supra note 142, at 221.A presumed tripartite committee had been 
composed in 1987; however, any proposed changes were disregarded.  See id.   
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employers, and some acceptance of trade union pluralism.154  
Nevertheless, it continued to allow the government to refuse to register 
trade unions.155 
By the mid-1990s, the ZCTU was supported by State policy 
opponents, which included civic groups, “elements of the middle class,” 
the urban community, and students.156 This opposition arose in particular 
against the government’s adoption of the ESAP, “both in terms of its 
conception and the lack of [social-partner participation] in its 
formulation.”157  
The ZCTU’s open opposition to the ESAP culminated into a public 
sector strike in 1996.158  The government responded by arresting the 
strike leaders and dismissing the majority of the public sector workers.159 
In 1999, even though the union continued to suffer from internal capacity 
weaknesses, it still continued to build its membership.160  The ZCTU 
elaborated its political campaign and, in May 1999, facilitated the 
formulation of an opposition political party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC).161  The MDC’s popularity grew remarkably 
quickly, and by 2000, it rivaled the ZANU-PF in every election.162  The 
MDC’s proliferating popularity was met, unfortunately, with increasing 
ruling party violence, and many of its members were killed during 
election campaigns from 2000-2003.163   
  
 154. See Lovemore Madhuku, Trade Unions and the Law, in STRIKING BACK: THE 
LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE IN ZIMBABWE 1980-2000, 105, 112 
(Brian Raftopoulos & Llyod Sachikonye eds., 2001). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Wood et al., supra note 134, at 6; Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 7. 
 157. See Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 8. 
 158. See Yeros, supra note 142, at 220–21; Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 10; 
Bhebe et al., supra note 139, at 70. 
 159. See Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 11.  
 160. See Yeros, supra note 142, at 227–30; Wood et al., supra note 134, at 6.  
 161. See Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 16. 
 162. See Maree, supra note 132, at 16; see also Jonathan Oshupeng Maseng, 
Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government: Platform for Political Battles or for Pursuit of Socio-
Economic Development?, PAN-AFR. VOICES FOR FREEDOM & JUST. (July 08, 2010), 
https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-inclusive-government.   
 163. See Maree, supra note 132, at 15; see also DWYER ET AL., supra note 130, at 
185; Raftopoulos, supra note 136, at 17–18.  
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Following years of “frustrating and dead-end negotiations between the 
ZCTU and the Labor Ministry,”164 a Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) 
was established in “1998 as a voluntary and unlegislated chamber.”165  
However, the anticipated social dialogue would not come to fruition for 
several years.166  Zimbabwe’s deteriorating economy, coupled with 
infighting, undermined the TNF’s systematic approach to consultation.167   
Efforts to develop new legislation in a tripartite setting were more 
promising in 2000, when the social partiers were consulted in the process 
of revising the 1985 Labor Relations Act.168  However, this promise was 
cut short in 2005, when the social partners were surprised by the 
government’s unilateral changes in law,169 including the withdrawal of 
certain collective bargaining rights.170 
The 2008 presidential elections were so close that neither the MDC 
nor the ZANU-PF held a majority.171  As noted by the ILO Commission 
of Inquiry that year, there was “a clear pattern of arrests, detentions, 
violence and torture by the security forces against trade [unions] that  
 
  
 164. See Fashoyin, supra note 141, at 115. 
 165. See Dominic Uzhenyu, Lack of Social Dialogue, The Force Behind Lack of 
Social Protection of Vulnerable Working Groups, A Study of Zimbabwe Scenario 3 
(presented at 17th ILERA World Congress, Feb. 25, 2015), available at 
http://www.ilera2015.com/dynamic/full/IL257.pdf. As its name suggests, the TNF 
is made up of government, workers’ representatives, and employers’ representatives. Id.  
It is mandated to discuss and negotiate social and economic matters, including labor 
legislation. Id. 
 166. See Fashoyin, supra note 141, at 115–16. 
 167. See id. at 120. 
 168. See id. at 116–17. 
 169. ILO, Labour Law Reform: ILO Capacity Building Workshop – The Report 6 
(Nyanga, 2010) (remarks from ZCTU – Cde. E. Mhuriro), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-addis_ababa/---sro-
harare/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_227711.pdf. 
 170. See Fashoyin, supra note 141, at 117.  By 2009, the TNF stopped meeting 
altogether.  See Uzhenyu, supra note 165, at 6.  See Fashoyin, supra note 141, at 120–22, 
for a detailed account of the collapse of the TNF.  While this collapse began in 2007, it 
had been precipitated by distrust and internal conflicts for several years.  Id. at 122.   
 171. See James Muzondidya, The Opposition Dilemma in Zimbabwe, in THE HARD 
ROAD TO REFORM: THE POLITICS OF ZIMBABWE’S GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT 39, 41 
(Brian Raftopoulos ed., 2013). 
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coincided with ZCTU nationwide events,” which indicated “centralized 
direction.”172  SADC leaders persuaded the Government to share power 
with MDC formations.173  This persuasion ultimately concluded in the 
Global Political Agreement (GPA), establishing an “Inclusive 
Government,” which was signed in September 2008.174  Despite initial 
optimism over the Inclusive Government, in 2011, violence against the 
ZANU-PF intensified, with parliamentarians detained and social activists 
beaten and tortured.175  
2. Swaziland: Historical Background 
Swaziland’s colonial rule consisted of few settlers; instead, it was 
upheld through appointed “traditional” chiefs who ensured a subservient 
urban population.176 When independence was won in 1968, the role of 
the chiefs was further strengthened through constitutional 









 173. See Patrick Dzimiri, African Multilateral Responses to the Crisis in 
Zimbabwe: A Responsibility to Protect Perspective, 39 STRATEGIC REV. S. AFR., 50, 65 
(2017); see also Nic Cheeseman & Blessing-Miles Tendi, Power-Sharing in Comparative 
Perspective: The Dynamics of ‘Unity Government’ in Kenya and Zimbabwe,, 48 J. MOD. 
AFR. STUD. 203, 204 (2010). For an in-depth analysis of the political developments and 
power-sharing in Zimbabwe at this time, see generally Derek Matyszak, Power 
Dynamics in Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government, Research Advocacy Unit (2009). 
 174. Formation was stalled until 2009.  See Adrienne LeBas, A New Twilight in 
Zimbabwe? The Perils of Power Sharing, 25 J. OF DEMOCRACY 52, 54–55 (2014); 
Dzimiri, supra note 173, at 67. 
 175. See, e.g., Danielle Connolly, The Global Political Agreement and Democratic 
Transition in Zimbabwe, at 3–5 (Oxford Transitional Just. Res. Working Paper Ser., June 
27, 2011).  
 176. See Wood et al., supra note 134, at 10. 
 177. Id. 
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nationalism and authoritarian populism,” actively discouraged trade 
union formations.178 
By the early 1970s, increasing social and political unrest challenged 
the traditional rule in the country.  In 1973, King Sobhuza II issued a 
royal decree suspending the constitution and banning all political parties, 
delegating to himself sole legislative and executive authority.179  In 1977, 
the King replaced the parliamentary system with the Tinkhundla 
system—a system in which “parliamentarians are elected outside of the 
political party system.”  Under this system, the monarch may “exercise[] 
absolute power over the executive and the legislat[ure].”180 
The King died in 1982 without heir or designate.181  “The [monarch] 
interregnum was [characterized] by a power struggle between royalist 
modernizers and traditionalists[;] the latter won.”182  Through alleged 
plotting and “a bizarre sequence of events,” the fourteen-year-old 
illegitimate son of Sobhuza, Makhosetive, became King Mswati III in 
1986.183   
The 1980 Swaziland Industrial Relations Act expressly recognized 
“the right of trade unions to exist, organize and associate freely.”184  
Nevertheless, by the early 1980s, the government began to overly restrict 
and otherwise interfere with union activity.185  At that time, employer-
favored work councils were heavily supported and institutionalized, 
further hindering effective bargaining between labor and management.186  
 
  
 178. Khabele Matlosa, Democracy and Conflict in Post-Apartheid Southern 
Africa: Dilemmas of Social Change in Small States, 74 INT’L AFF., 319, 321 (1998). 
 179. Id; see also Maree, supra note 132, at 17.   
 180. Claude Kabema, Swaziland’s Struggle with Political Liberalisation, 
ELECTORAL INST. S. AFR. RES. REP. no. 3, at 9 (2004).  
 181. See Freedom House, Swaziland: A Failed Feudal State: A Freedom House 
Report, at 11 (2013). 
 182. See Wood et al., supra note 106, at 10.  
 183. Id.; see also Freedom House, supra note 181, at 11; DWYER ET AL., supra 
note 130, at 195.  
 184. See Takirambudde, supra note 38, at 49 
 185. See id.  
 186. Martin Fransman, Labour, Capital and the State in Swaziland, 1962-1977, S. 
AFR. LAB. BULL. 58, 77 (1982). 
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In 1983, the underground People’s United Democratic Movement 
(PUDEMO) was established to rally popular support for revolutionary 
change.187  It “was the only active political party in Swaziland between 
1983 and 1996.”188  By the late 1980s, political pressure to change the 
State system was high, and PUDEMO’s efforts, which had begun as 
clandestine, became more overt.189  Beneath the PUDEMO umbrella, the 
Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) began to organize youth 
and civil society groups.190  Despite the increasing trade union activity, 
the government was able to use its Industrial Relations Act to limit and 
prohibit political activities, and increasingly imposed other legal 
restrictions on the right to associate.191  
Unsurprisingly, trade unions soon became the platform for political 
opposition.  The SFTU, which had been established in 1983, began 
gaining momentum in 1997, when it staged a wide-scale action strike.192  
Following the strike, the SFTU and PUDEMO joined previous 
opposition groups to form the Swaziland Democratic Association 
(SDA).193  The SDA included the SFTU participants, as well as women, 
church groups and unemployed groups.194  
A new Constitution was enacted in 2005, marking a “win” for 
absolutism over democracy.195  It provided no new rights to civil society 




 187. See Wood et al., supra note 134, at 10; Maree, supra note 132, at 17. 
 188. See Freedom House, supra note 181, at 37. 
 189. See Mfaniseni Fana Sihlongonyane, The Invisible Hand of the Royal Family 
in the Political Dynamics of Swaziland, 2 AFR. & ASIAN STUD. 155, 175 (2003). 
 190. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 130, at 195–96. 
 191. See, e.g., Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1990, published 77th ILC session, 
ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:2081423 (last visited Oct.22, 2018). 
 192. See Maree, supra note 132, at 17. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.   
 195. See Freedom House, supra note 181, at 12. 
 196. See Maree, supra note 132, at 18. 
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Instead, it raised serious questions concerning freedom of association, 
political rights, and freedoms and the election process.197   
By 2006, the political climate had deteriorated to the extent that 
members of Swaziland’s banned political parties were arrested for anti-
government threats.198  To assuage regional and international concerns, 
the Swazi government undertook a number of legislative reforms to 
allow for freedom of speech and assembly.199  The resulting legislation 
nevertheless contained a proviso that “the [K]ing could suspend these 
rights if he deemed them contrary to the public interest.”200 
In 2008, the King signed the Suppression of Terrorism Act, which 
further hindered workers’ efforts to organize.201  The Act provided no 
clear definition of “terrorist act” and, consequently, was able to reach 
into civil society activities.202  In 2010, the Act was renewed and, 
according to trade unions, has been used to target trade union 
activities.203 
Despite the official antagonism, Swaziland’s largest union, the Trade 
Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA), was founded in 2012, 
“bringing together the SFTU, the smaller Swaziland Federation of Labor, 
and the unaligned Swaziland National Association of Teachers.”204  The 
new federation immediately called for legislative reforms and declared a 
“total boycott of the national elections in 2013 unless the elections [could 
be] held under a multiparty system.”205  In response, the government 
deregistered the federation that year and set up a rival workers’ group, 
the Swaziland Economic Empowerment Workers Union.206   
  
 197. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 130, at 197. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Wood et al., supra note 134, at 11. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Freedom House, supra note 181, at 23. 
 202. See id. 
 203. LO/FTF COUNCIL, SWAZILAND – LABOUR MARKET PROFILE, at 9 (2013). 
 204. Id.; See Wood, et al., supra note 134, at 12. 
 205. See Freedom House, supra note 181, at 27. 
 206. See Wood, et al., supra note 134, at 12; see also Observation (CEACR) - 
adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013), ILO (2013),  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:3084144.   
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B. The ILO in Zimbabwe and Swaziland 
Zimbabwe and Swaziland both emerged from colonialism as 
authoritarian regimes that placed high restrictions on freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.207  These countries adopted new 
constitutions and laws favoring strong government over labor rights.208  
As described below, the ILO’s supervisory bodies noted these failures, 
which were of particular disappointment after their promising 
ratifications of ILO Conventions (Nos. 87 and 98) concerning freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.   
1. Concerns of the ILO Supervisory Bodies 
The ILO’s supervisory bodies, including the CEACR and the CFA, 
raised concerns with both Swaziland and Zimbabwe nearly every year 
following their ratifications of the ILO’s Conventions.209  The ILO also 
requested both countries to appear before the annual ILC, given the 
severity of the concerns.210   
  
 207. See supra pp. 18–20, 22–23. 
 208. See supra pp. 20–21, 23–24. 
 209. In Swaziland, the CEACR has published observations concerning the 
government’s failure to effectively implement Convention No. 87 since its ratification of 
the Convention in 1978, and on a nearly annual basis since 1990.  The government has 
also been called before the International Labor Conference on multiple occasions and has 
had four complaints against it filed by trade unions before the CFA.  See ILO 
NORMLEX, Supervising the Application of International Labour Standards for 
Eswatini, ILO, 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY
_ID,P11110_CONTEXT:103336,SC (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
In Zimbabwe, the CEACR has published observations on a nearly annual concerning the 
government’s failure to effectively implement Convention No. 87 since its ratification of 
the Convention in 2003.  The government has also been called before the International 
Labor Conference on multiple occasions, and has had twelve complaints against it filed 
by trade unions before the CFA.  See ILO NORMLEX, Zimbabwe, ILO,  
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY
_ID:103183 (last visited (Oct. 22, 2018). 
 210. Under the ILO’s supervisory system, countries that have failed to implement 
ratified Conventions are invited to appear before the Conference Committee on the 
Application of Standards, a tripartite committee of the ILC, to provide information on the 
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The ILO called the government of Zimbabwe to appear before the 
ILC in 2002.211  After its initial appearance, the ILO called upon the 
government every year until 2008, when the Zimbabwe workers and 
employers raised a complaint under the ILO’s highest supervisory body, 
the Commission of Inquiry.212  As noted by the ILO, it “was the first 
occasion on which a Commission of Inquiry had arisen out of 
simultaneous complaints from Workers and Employers delegates to the 
Conference.”213   
Initially, the government refused to appear at the ILC to address the 
merits of the complaint.214  In 2009, however, it permitted the 
Commission of Inquiry to enter the country.215  In its report, the 
Commission found that the “Government of Zimbabwe accepted that 
‘things’ had happened, that they were regrettable and that it was 
important to ensure that such ‘things’ did not happen again.”216  It 
nevertheless found systematic violations of labor rights against trade 
unions and issued a list of recommendations for the government to 





labor rights in question.  See INT’L LABOUR ORG., RULES OF THE GAME: A BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 53, at 103.  
 211. See Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2002, Publication: 90th ILC 
session: Zimbabwe, ILO (2002), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:2555881.  
 212. See generally Commission of Inquiry, COMPLAINT (article 26) ZIMBABWE 
- C087, C098, ILO, (2010), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50012:0::NO:50012:P50012_CO
MPLAINT_PROCEDURE_ID,P50012_LANG_CODE:2508373,en:NO. 
 213. See id.  
 214. See Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: Publication: 97th ILC session 
(2008), Zimbabwe, ILO (2008),  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:2556331.  
 215. See ILO, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, supra note 172, at vii. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id.  
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The ILO called the government of Swaziland to appear before the ILC 
in 1996.218  The Swazi government attended and defended its laws and 
practices, claiming that allegations of restrictions on fundamental rights 
and freedoms were baseless.219  The ILC continued to call the Swazi 
government to explain its labor laws and practices nearly every year 
from 1996 to 2015.220  Neither the Swazi worker nor employer delegates 
requested the Commission of Inquiry. 
2. ILO Assistance in Zimbabwe and Swaziland 
SADCs’ commitment to harmonize and respect labor rights 
established incentives for its Members to address national labor concerns 
and opened a possible channel of ILO assistance into Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe.  As set out in Table 2, below, the ILO provided assistance 
from 2008 to 2015 through in-country missions, advisory assistance, and 
ILO DWCPs.  This assistance aimed to strengthen local capacities to 
enable freedom of association and social dialogue.   
  
 218. See Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: Publication: 83rd ILC session 
(1996), Swaziland, ILO (1996), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:2555404.  
 219. See generally id. 
 220. To access those comments, see the ILO’s discussion of cases of serious 
failure, Case of serious failure (CAS) - Discussion: 2017, Publication: 106th ILC session 
(2017), Eswatini, ILO, 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT
_ID:3791597 (last visited Dec. 02, 2018).  
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Table 2: ILO Assistance (2008-2015) 
Zimbabwe 
In-Country Missions Advisory Assistance DWCP 
2009: Commission of Inquiry 
2009: ILO High-Level Mission on 













2014: ILO High-Level Mission on 
Freedom of Association 
2009: capacity-building workshop 
on social dialogue 
2010: capacity-building workshop 
on labor law reform and the TNF 
2010: launch of a technical 
assistance package to facilitate the 
recommendations of the 
Commission of Inquiry. 
2011: capacity-building courses on 
freedom of association and the TNF 
2012: training workshops and 
capacity-building workshops 
2013: capacity-building workshop 
on freedom of association 
2015: capacity building training 
DWCP: (2009-2011): “[The] ILO 
will provide technical and resource 
assistance in the setting up of a full 
time TNF secretariat to prepare for 
meetings of the TNF and follow up 
on its decisions.” (DWCP, p. 15). 
 
DWCP (2012-2015): “[s]upport 
has been extended towards 
promoting and strengthening of the 
social dialogue processes under the 
[TNF], including institutional 
strengthening for effective 
dialogue learning from the good 
cases from the region and the 
world.” (DWCP, p. 10). 
Swaziland 
In-Country Advisory Assistance DWCP 
2010: ILO High-Level Mission on 






2014: ILO High-Level Mission on 
Freedom of Association 
 
2010: Sub-Regional Tripartite 
workshop on ILO standards 
2011: capacity-building courses on 
freedom of association. 
2013: capacity-building training on 
freedom of association 
DWCP (2010-2014): prioritizing 
social dialogue in view of “very 
glaring decent work deficits.” Also 
noting that, through ILO 
assistance, the government had 
established a National Steering 
Committee on Social Dialogue. 
(DWCP, pp. 16, 19) 




03183,SC.  Information concerning the DWCPs for each country is found at the applicable DWCP years, as 
referenced infra n. 180–86. 
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As outlined in Table 2, the ILO provided assistance to Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe through a series of missions and workshops, as well as 
DWCPs in both countries that were designed to strengthen social 
dialogue.221  The ILO and Zimbabwe first entered into a DWCP in 
2006,222 which was then renewed in 2009,223 and again in 2012.224  The 
ILO and Swaziland entered into a DWCP in 2010.225   
In the initial ILO-Zimbabwe DWCP, the ILO noted that the United 
National Development Assistant Framework had called for specialized 
agencies, including itself, to draw up development programs for that 
country.226  The DWCP identified as priority the need to continue to 
strengthen social dialogue in the country, and subsequent DWCPs 
identified the need to strengthen the capacity of the TNF to enable it to 
“engage in effective social dialogue and influence socio-economic and 
labour market policies.”227 
 
  
 221. See supra Table 2. 
 222. This initial DWCP has been followed up by a DWCP in 2009, and 2012.  See 
Decent Work Country Programme for Zimbabwe (2006 - 2007), ILO 
https://www.ilo.org/addisababa/information-resources/publications/WCMS_229359/lang-
-en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 223. ILO, Decent Work Country Programme for Zimbabwe, (2009–2011), 
available at 
http://www.africayouthskills.org/images/pdf/lrg/decent_work_country_program
me_2009_-_11.pdf [hereinafter 2009 DWCP Zimbabwe].  
 224. ILO, Decent Work Country Programme for Zimbabwe, (2012–2015), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-
addis_ababa/---sro-harare/documents/genericdocument/wcms_226543.pdf 
[hereinafter 2012 DWCP Zimbabwe].  
 225. ILO, Decent Work Country Programme for Swaziland, at 10–11 (2010-2014), 
available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---
program/documents/genericdocument/wcms_561068.pdf [hereinafter 2010 DWCP 
Swaziland]. 
 226. ILO, Decent Work Country Programme for Zimbabwe, at 9 (2006-2007), 
available at   
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-addis_ababa/---sro-
harare/documents/publication/wcms_229359.pdf [hereinafter 2006 DWCP Zimbabwe]. 
 227. 2009 DWCP ZIMBABWE, supra note 223, at 15.  
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In the ILO-Swaziland DWCP, the ILO noted that it had analyzed the 
country’s labor and economic situation with the full participation of the 
social partners and key national stakeholders.228  The resulting DWCP 
identified as priority the need to strengthen social dialogue in the 
country.229  Although the program noted that it had helped the country 
establish a National Steering committee on Social Dialogue,230 it also 
acknowledged that there were “still very glaring decent work deficits 
under” the social dialogue objective231 and a “dire need to strengthen the 
institutional structures for social dialogue.”232  Despite this “dire need,” 
the ILO proceeded with designing the DWCP with the social partners, 
however weak. 
C. Impact in Zimbabwe and Swaziland 
Between 2008 and 2015, the ILO provided similar assistance in 
Zimbabwe and Swaziland that aimed to strengthen freedom of 
association and social dialogue.  Through its DWCPs, the ILO worked 
with the national social dialogue bodies (the TNF in Zimbabwe and the 
establishment of the National Steering Committee in Swaziland) to 
ensure consultations and dialogue in the formulation of national policies 
and strategies.233  Despite those similarities, the ILO’s assistance in the 
countries had a markedly different impact on national labor laws and 
practices.  As discussed below, the ILO’s assistance enabled Zimbabwe 
to strengthen its laws and practices.  In contrast, the Swazi government 
continued to place severe restrictions on labor rights. 
1. Zimbabwe: A Case of Progress 
As noted, the ILO and Zimbabwe entered into three generations of 
DWCPs.  When the Program was first designed, in 2005, trade unions  
  
 228. 2010 DWCP SWAZILAND, supra note 225, at 10–11. 
 229. Id. at 25-26; 35. 
 230. Id. at 16. 
 231. Id. at 19. 
 232. Id. at 16. 
 233. See supra pp. 27–28. 
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were already represented through the TNF.234  In 2009, the TNF faced 
serious setbacks and discontinued holding consultations.235  In designing 
the DWCP Program that year, the ILO, government, and tripartite 
stakeholders in Zimbabwe agreed that strengthening the TNF should be a 
program priority.236  In 2012, the DWCP noted that the ILO’s assistance 
in 2010 and 2011 to facilitate the recommendations of the Commission 
of Inquiry had achieved “remarkable achievements,” including “steps 
towards harmonization of the labour legislation and the setting up of the 
TNF secretariat and capacity building on freedom of association and 
collective bargaining . . . .”237 
In 2013, Zimbabwe continued to face ILO criticism for failing to 
strengthen its labor laws.238  The ILO called the Zimbabwe government 
before the ILC that year, asking the government to explain why it had 
failed to adopt legislation or improve the protection of union rights in 
practice.239  In response, the government claimed that resource 
constraints obstructed concrete progress, but pledged to continue to work 
towards strengthening its laws and practices.240  
Shortly after the ILC, the Zimbabwe government reported on the 
labor legislation that had been adopted or was otherwise in the process of 
tripartite consultations towards adoption.241  Many of its legislative acts  
 
  
 234. 2006 DWCP Zimbabwe, supra note 226, at 13. 
 235. See Uzhenyu, supra note 165, at 7. 
 236. 2009 DWCP Zimbabwe, supra note 223, at 15.  
 237. 2012 DWCP Zimbabwe, supra note 179, at 7. 
 238. See Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: Publication: 102nd ILC session 
(2013), Zimbabwe, ILO (2013), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:3131759.  
 239. Id. Perhaps in solidarity, the Government representative of Swaziland 
intervened during this discussion to support the Government’s initiatives thus far and 
called on the ILO to continue to provide the necessary support to the Government, in 
particular technical assistance to enhance capacity.  See id.  
 240. See generally id. 
 241. See Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session 
(2016), ILO (2016), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:3255910.  
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and handbooks had been drafted with ILO assistance, and the ILO 
provided a workshop to involve the social partners in the regional labor 
legislation harmonization process.242  By 2014, the Zimbabwe 
government, workers, and employers drafted a TNF Bill and the 
government submitted it to Cabinet.243  By 2015, TNF negotiations had 
resumed and, pursuant to those negotiations, representatives of 
government, employers, and workers had agreed to review the country’s 
labor laws together.244 
2. Swaziland: A Case of Challenges  
The ILO and Swaziland entered into the DWCP in 2010.245  
Unfortunately, trade unions at that time remained small and factional.246  
TUCOSWA, which would eventually bring these unions together under 
one collective voice, would not be formed for two more years.247  While 
the ILO had helped Swaziland establish a National Steering Committee 




 242. See Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2016, published 106th ILC session 
(2017), ILO (2017),  
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:3297184.  
 243. See Zimbabwe, in AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2015: REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND SPATIAL INCLUSION 10 (AfDB, OECD, UNDP eds., 14th ed. 2015), 
available at https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/african-economic-outlook-
2015/zimbabwe_aeo-2015-44-en#page1; 
 244. See Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals: 2010-2015 Final Progress 
Report, at § 3.9 (2016), available at  
http://www.zw.undp.org/content/dam/zimbabwe/docs/MDG/UNDP_ZW_MDG
_MDGR2000-2015.pdf.    
 245. 2010 DWCP SWAZILAND, supra note 225. 
 246. See supra p. 24. 
 247. See supra p. 24. Despite the lack of a strong union presence at the time of 
negotiations, the ILO DWCP states that it was carried out following a country-situational 
analysis, with the full participation of the ILO’s tripartite constituents.  See 2010 DWCP 
Swaziland, supra note 225, at 10–11.  According to the DWCP, these consultations were 
“[i]ntensive” and “wide.”  Id. at 11. 
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Committee was not effectively functioning and that Swazi workers could 
consequently not use it to address labor concerns. 248 
TUCOSWA’s formation in 2012249 was promising.  However, the 
government immediately deregistered it, effectively preventing it from 
ever participating in the National Steering Committee. 250  The 
Committee was therefore unable to operate with the participation of all 
of the social partners, and implementation of the program was “severely 
hampered.”251 
The government adopted the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act in 
2014, which introduced provisions concerning the registration of 
employers’ and workers’ federations.252  Nevertheless, in 2014, the 
Minister of Labor suspended or refused to register all federations and 
TUCOSWA affiliates.253  This announcement was made during the 
implementation of the ILO’s DWCP and following the ILO’s high-level 
mission, which had been carried out in January that year.254  The 
government also ordered the dissolution of unions pending the 
amendment of the Industrial Relations Act.255  In 2014, the ILO noted 
that the TUCOSWA was still not registered, and noted with deep concern 
that TUCOSWA’s lawyer had been arrested and sentenced for defending 
the union’s challenge to deregistration.256   
  
 248. Id. at 16. 
 249. See LO/FTF COUNCIL, supra note 203, at 4. 
 250. See Decent Work Country Programmes in Southern Africa, NEWSLETTER 
(ILO, Pretoria, S. Afr.), Apr. 2013, at 7, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-addis_ababa/---ilo-
pretoria/documents/publication/wcms_230786.pdf.  
 251. Id. 
 252. See Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2014 (Act No. 11 of 2014), 21 
Swaziland Government Gazette Extraordinary 128, S1 (13 November 2014). 
 253. See generally, Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2014, Publication: 103rd 
ILC session (2014) - Swaziland, ILO (2014), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_CO
MMENT_ID:3175047.  
 254. See generally id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session 
(2015), ILO (2015), 
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VI. KEY CONSIDERATIONS 
The cases of Zimbabwe and Swaziland illustrate how the ILO’s labor-
related assistance produces varied results.  In countries that have 
effective social partners and a social dialogue platforms, the ILO is able 
to hold effective consultations and design an assistance program in 
accordance with real needs.  Where those countries lack effective social 
partners and social dialogue mechanisms, the ILO is left to design 
programs without full participation, resulting in weak results.257  
Prior to receiving ILO assistance, Zimbabwe and Swaziland shared 
many similarities, including a common history of colonialism, 
authoritarian rule, and strong restrictions on freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.258  They differed, however, concerning the degree 
of social-partner participation during the design of the ILO’s assistance 
programs.259  Following ILO assistance in both countries, the similarities 
in freedom of association and collective bargaining Zimbabwe and 
Swaziland ended.260 
In Zimbabwe, workers and employers had a platform to consult 
through the TNF.261  Moreover, the worker and employer delegates to the 
ILO were active and worked together to form the ILO’s first bilateral 
complaint before the Commission of Inquiry.262  Following up on their 
expressed concerns, the ILO’s Commission of Inquiry entered the 
country in 2009.263  It encountered a government that acknowledged that 
“‘things’ were regrettable, and that it was important to ensure that such 





 257. See Freedom of Association and Development, supra note 29, at 4. 
 258. See supra pp. 17–23.  
 259. See supra pp. 24–27. 
 260. See supra pp. 28–30. 
 261. See supra p. 28–29. 
 262. See supra p. 24. 
 263. See supra p. 25.  
 264. See ILO, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, supra note 172. 
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In Swaziland, the situation was much more severe.  The Swazi 
government refused to accept the ILO’s criticism, effectively prevented 
any form of social dialogue or trade union participation, and deregistered 
the country’s largest union.265  Instead of tailoring its development 
strategy to account for the divergent levels of social dialogue in those 
countries, the ILO implemented essentially the same assistance.266  
Consequently, while that assistance proved effective in Zimbabwe, it was 
largely disregarded in Swaziland.267  
A. Lessons Learned: The Case Against Orthodoxy 
Under orthodox theory,268 the ILO’s assistance in both countries to 
strengthen the rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining, and 
social dialogue, should have positively improved the laws and practices 
in both States.  By designing its assistance programs in consultation with 
the national tripartite stakeholders, this assistance should have given 
those stakeholders greater autonomy and ownership, which then should 
have enabled them to strengthen and enforce labor laws and practices.   
However, the ILO’s experiences in Swaziland and Zimbabwe call this 
orthodox theory into question.  Whereas Zimbabwe had a platform, albeit 
weak, to engage in social dialogue during the design and implementation 
of the ILO’s DWCP, Swaziland did not.269  Zimbabwe’s infrastructure 
enabled the ILO’s development assistance to take form, become 




 265. See supra pp. 23, 25. 
 266. See supra pp. 25–27. 
 267. See supra pp. 27–30. 
 268. The orthodox approach presupposes the universality of best-practices 
approaches See generally Tobias Berger & Milli Lake, Human Rights, the Rule of Law, 
and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE AND LIMITED STATEHOOD 
416, 425 (Thomas Risse, Tanja A. Börzel & Anke Draude eds., 2018) (distinguishing 
orthodox and heterodox approaches).  This approach would assume that the ILO’s 
DWCP model would contain the same steps as outlined in Table 1 for all countries. See 
supra p. 11. 
 269. See supra pp. 29–31.  
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practices.270  Swaziland’s infrastructure suppressed social-partner 
participation, and the ILO’s assistance had no mechanism to absorb it.271   
B. From Orthodox to Heterodox 
The ILO’s assistance requires a new kind of thinking.  Rather than its 
traditional orthodox approach and DWCP multi-step process, ILO 
assistance should take a heterodox approach.272  This approach would 
enable the Organization to examine each national circumstance, 
including assessing the national actors, prior to designing its DWCPs.  
The ILO’s examination should focus on the balance of power between 
the State and the social partners and assess whether political resistance is 
strong enough to preclude effective social-partner participation.273  If the 
Organization determines that the social partners are not effective, its 
assistance should target capacity-building to develop and strengthen an 
effective platform for social dialogue before progressing towards its 
DWCP design.   
Unfortunately, this approach will be challenging for the ILO.  As 
noted previously, the ILO’s development programs are unique among 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.274  
However, in some instances, the very uniqueness that gives the ILO a 
comparative advantage in providing labor-related assistance ends up 
hurting the Organization.  This is particularly true where, like in  
  
 270. See supra pp. 30–31. 
 271. See supra pp. 31–32. A similar situation was observed in the context of the 
ILO’s harmonization assistance in West and Central Africa, in which critics “stressed that 
although the ILO has an important role to play on labor law reform, the ILO could do 
more to ensure that trade unions are actors in the labor law reform process, rather than 
merely spectators.”  Blackett, supra note 9, at 483 (and citations therein). 
 272. The heterodox approach examines each challenge and situation differently 
and attempts to recognize the relevant actors and local problems prior to designing a 
unique solution.  See Berger & Lake, supra note 249, at 425.   
 273. See Banks, supra note 78, at 71–72 nn.72–73; 103–06.  See generally 
Fenwick et al., supra note 34, at 24 (“A lack of capacity among trade unions limits the 
extent to which they can effectively protect and serve members’ interests at the 
workplace level.”). 
 274. See supra pp. 4–5. 
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Swaziland, the ILO’s consultation-based design and lack of 
conditionality leave it at the mercy of government-dominated 
programing.275   
The ILO is mandated by its Constitution and Declaration to provide 
assistance only when that assistance is designed in consultation with the 
country’s government, workers, and employers.276  In theory, that 
mandate ensures that its assistance program addresses the real demands 
and needs of the tripartite actors in the country.  But in cases where those 
actors are too weak to be effective, the ILO’s assistance is essentially 
held hostage: it cannot second-guess the tripartite structure with which its 
program must be designed, yet must still use the results of those 
consultations—however dominated by the stronger factions—to form the 
basis of its programs.  Thus, when government regulations and practices 
effectively preclude trade union participation and social dialogue, the 
ILO’s consultations cannot truly reflect the needs of workers. 
The ILO’s assistance also lacks the strict conditionality of traditional 
multilateral institutions.  This “no strings attached” approach is 
attractive: countries may request assistance while maintaining flexibility 
to adjust their markets and labor approaches without fear of having their 
resources revoked.  However, by providing its assistance so generously, 
the ILO is left with little recourse when recipient countries fail to 
implement ILO recommendations.  The ILO’s supervisory bodies 
attempt to provide this approach with some teeth by requesting 
governments to appear at the ILC and to accept ILO high-level missions 
and by publishing comments highlighting areas of concern.  
Nevertheless, as the case of Swaziland illustrates, governments are able 
to control much of this process.  They can refuse to appear at the ILC, 
they can refuse to allow the ILO to visit their countries, and they can 
dismiss the ILO’s published comments.   
 
  
 275. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 42, at 143 (noting that the ILO’s promise to 
bring about consensus on labor standards through technical assistance remains unfulfilled 
because “incentives or disincentives available to the ILO to apply to countries in order to 
encourage them to promote labor standards that these countries have endorsed are limited 
in their effectiveness.”). 
 276. See supra Section III.  
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Despite these shortcomings, the ILO should nevertheless be able to 
control the design of its programs.  Countries are motivated to receive 
ILO assistance (and not that of the IMF or World Bank) for a reason.  
These countries may be driven by their regional commitments to 
harmonize their labor policies, or they may be driven by their national 
interest to dispel industrial and political instability stemming from 
worker and civil discontent.  This could be true in countries such as 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe, where the suppression of labor rights has led 
to widespread worker strikes, political rivalries, and civil society 
protests.  Regardless of the driver, the requesting countries need 
assistance that focuses on labor rights.  In this area, the ILO holds a 
monopoly.  
The ILO is therefore in a strong position to lay some degree of 
groundwork prior to providing its labor-related assistance.  While it may 
not be able to impose pre-defined targets or conditionality, it can insist 
that its assistance (such as resources and trainings) focuses on 
strengthening and organizing the social partners.  Only when the ILO 
determines that the social partners in a recipient country have real 
representation and there is an effective social dialogue platform should it 
begin consultations with those social partners on a DWCP design. 
One potential drawback of this prerequisite step is that any real 
strengthening of a civil society and their social dialogue mechanisms 
necessarily takes time.277  This may be difficult given that most 
development programs to enable program monitoring and evaluation 
require instant and concrete outcomes,278 including those in the ILO.279   
  
 277. See, e.g., Takirambudde, supra note 38, at 40 (“However, democratization, 
civil society and human rights are not a design but a process.”).  
 278. See SARKAR, supra note 15, at 275 (“the IMF structural adjustment program 
required the sovereign debtor country to implement demanding economic stabilization 
and liberalization measures very quickly.”); Frances Stewart & Michael Wang, Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers within the Human Rights Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 447, 459 (Philip Alston & Mary 
Robinson eds., 2005). 
 279. The ILO’s DWCP are, by definition, “time-bound.”  See INT’L LABOUR 
OFFICE, ILO DECENT WORK COUNTRY PROGRAMME: A PRACTICAL GUIDEBOOK supra note 
72, at 1 (“The ILO introduced time-bound and resourced country programmes, called 
Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs), in 2004.”).  
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However, any amount of time saved by skipping this step, as 
demonstrated in Swaziland, will result in misdirected assistance and lack 
of concrete results.280   
VII. CONCLUSION 
The ILO, as the responsible Organization for providing labor-rights 
assistance to developing countries, is faced with a dilemma: it aims to 
empower and mobilize social partners to support labor standards during 
economic development, but its assistance programs require a certain 
degree of social-partners capacity at the outset.  Unlike traditional 
development institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, the ILO’s 
assistance cannot impose strict conditions or outcomes. 
The ILO’s task is not simple.  Diverse economic capacities among 
RIA members require programs to address country-specific historical and 
political trajectories.  When those members have suppressed worker 
rights in favor of State control, worker representatives lack the capacity 
to effectively engage in social dialogue, and the ILO cannot engage them 
during its program design consultations. 
Prior to designing those programs, therefore, the ILO must first invest 
its resources (when needed) to strengthen the social dialogue platform 
and social-partner capacity.  This task will be difficult, as it requires 
preconditions and potential delays.  Nevertheless, by constructing its 
assistance to ensure full and effective consultations at the outset, the 
ILO’s assistance will have a greater impact on the labor rights in 
developing countries.  In so doing, it will answer the multilateral call for 
ensuring labor rights within the framework of economic development.  
  
 280. As recognised during the ILO’s Africa Regional Meeting, “[t]he involvement 
of employers’ and workers’ organizations in the development, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of DWCPs and national development frameworks is vital for 
their success and ensures that they promote decent work. The ILO must step up its 
capacity-building work with employers’ and workers’ organizations . . . .”  See Report of 
the Director General, ILO., Empowering Africa’s Peoples with Decent Work – 12th 
African Regional Meeting, Johannesburg, 11-14 October 2011, at 83 (2011), available at  
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_161396.pdf.    
92 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.1 
 
 
